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Evropeiskii potop: The Discourse of Apocalypse and Silence in Russian Press Coverage 
on the Issue of Refugees 




In the fall and winter of 2015–2016, well over 5000 people fled across Russia’s north-western 
borders into Norway.1 This so-called Arctic route for refugees became one of the main topics 
in Norwegian public debate, prolonging and even intensifying discourse on the refugee 
issue, having dominated not only Norwegian but global news media since the tremendous 
influx of migrants crossing the Mediterranean ocean in the preceding months. While the 
situation in these northern hinterlands might seem only a drop in the ocean of what the 
UNHCR calls “the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time […],” referencing how 
over 60 million people are considered forcibly displaced globally,2 the Arctic route became 
one of the core issues in Norwegian public debate, as well as a predominant theme in its 
relationship with Russia.3 Against this backdrop, exploring Russian discourse on the refugee 
situation of 2015–2016 is a pertinent task. The present attempt finds its theoretical and 
methodological basis in the critical discourse analysis and treatment of news as discourse as 
formulated by Teun A. van Dijk (1993 and 1988). Another concept vital to the study is Sergei 
Oushakine’s (2000) theory of post-Soviet aphasia. The data is gathered from four newspapers, 
selected to give a broad representation of Russian news discourse:4 the government’s 
																																																								
1 Finland also saw an influx of refugees across the Finnish-Russian border. However, this route saw much less 
traffic than the route to Norway. For a summary of the refugee situation in the Far North, see i.a. Standish 
(2016) and Hohmann and Laruelle (2016). 
2 See UNHCR (2016a) and UNHCR (2016b). 
3 To illustrate the highly intense Norwegian news discourse on the issue: Norway’s largest internet newspaper 
VG named the situation in the Far North a “Norwegian-Russian asylum war.” See Sæther (2015) (in Norwegian). 
4 The choice of the newspaper as source is motivated both by the cultural significance assigned to the written 
word in Russia, the historical function of the Russian newspaper as ideological space, discussed by i.a. Ivan 
Zassoursky (2004) in Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia, as well as the role of the press in constructing the 
public as formulated by i.a. Jürgen Habermas (2002) in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 
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official publication Rossiiskaia Gazeta, the tabloid Komsomolskaia Pravda, the regional 
Murmanskii Vestnik, and the the critical-minded Novaia Gazeta. 
The paper is organized in the following sections: First, I give a brief overview of the 
study’s theoretical and methodological framework. Second, I present my research material 
and questions. The main part of the article is dedicated to the data, sorted by the respective 
papers. Finally, I will present my conclusions. 
 
1. Analytical framework 
The appeal of critical discourse analysis (CDA) as method in the study of public debate, is 
that it establishes a link between concrete language use and the abstract notion of the public 
mind. Discourse, or rather, dominant discourse, influences social cognition, i.e. socially shared 
mental representations. Discursive power translates then, in keeping with CDA, to power 
over the public’s perception of and attitude to current affairs (van Dijk 1993, 257). The 
specific case of news also lends itself to CDA.5 By using persuasive content features, i.e. 
discursive strategies to enhance the likelihood of the reader accepting the news text as 
truth, news discourse has unique potential power over the reader’s social cognition (van 
Dijk 1988, 84–85). By uncovering the presence of discursive structures conducive to such 
cognitive control in Russian news discourse on the refugee issue, we will also be able to 
uncover probable predominant social cognition on the subject. 
CDA concerns itself mainly with positive discourse phenomena, such as the presence of 
rhetorical figures and the organization of facts within specific narratives. Meanwhile, my 
biggest challenge while studying the Russian press’ representation of the refugee situation, 
was the absence of any kind of discourse. This applied in particular to the case of the Arctic 
route. While this issue triggered thousands of news texts in the Norwegian press, relevant 
texts in the Russian material amounted to a mere handful. This discursive “black hole” can 
be illuminated by the concept of post-Soviet aphasia, formulated by Serguei Oushakine 
(2000).6 The premise for this theory is that social change brings about discursive change, 
and thus a change and expansion of the “sayable.” In this new discursive field the subject is 
forced to establish a new verbal consciousness. However, according to Oushakine, in the 
societal and accompanying discursive upheaval since the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
semiotic development and expansion of the sayable has not been able to keep up. For the 
post-Soviet subject, therefore, the “new” reality is unavailable for discourse. The result is a 
state of discursive lacking, i.e. the inability to communicate, as well as a state of discursive 
																																																								
5 “[…] the production and understanding of news are processes that are fully determined by cognitive 
representations. The meaning of a news article is not objectively there in the text but rather arises from a 
reconstruction by the reader, to be made explicit in terms of memory processes and representations” (van 
Dijk 1988, 99). 
6 Oushakine is greatly influenced by the theories on aphasia developed by Roman Jakobson, i.e. the regression 
and disintegration of individual speech. In his own conceptualization, however, aphasia signifies a collective 
discursive behaviour. Another important influence is found in Nina Naumova’s (1999) and Ellen Carnaghan’s 
(1996) analyses of contemporary Russia as a silent (безмолвствующая) culture, in which the social silence is 
an expression of a lacking sense of belonging to society, as well as an inability to formulate opinions due to 
both apathy and an information deficit. 
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compensation, i.e. a regression to the symbolic forms of previous social – and discursive – 
stages (Oushakine 2000, 993–95).7 
 
2. Material and research questions 
For the present study, all digitally accessible news texts involving refugees in the four 
newspapers, published between April 1st 2015 and April 1st 2016, were examined. My 
research questions were as follows: 
What characterizes discourse on the refugee situation of 2015–16 in the Russian press? 
Specifically, who says what, how, in which newspapers? Which social cognitions are conveyed 
to the reader, and which of them dominate the discourse? And finally, are there any 




3.1 Rossiiskaia Gazeta 
A common denominator in the refugee discourse of all four newspapers, is what I will refer 
to as an apocalyptic rhetoric. Let us illustrate this first with some examples from Rossiiskaia 
Gazeta: 
Европу ведут в джунгли […] Жители европейских стран, что называется, «на 
своей шкуре», начинают ощущать то, насколько беспомощной перед лавиной 
беженцев, среди которых оказались преступники всех мастей, оказалась 
толерантная Европа (Makarychev, 19.01.2016).8  
The use of inanimate metaphors puts the concept of refugees through a semantic shift: 
their signification is disentangled from the category of humans, and transferred to that of 
natural disasters. The images of the wild jungle and the devastating avalanche, before which 
the people of Europe are helpless, creates a strong sense of threat. The representation of 
the refugees as criminals, although closer to the category of humans, does nothing to 
mitigate the threatening rhetoric.  
The representation of the refugee situation as a type of natural disaster has an extremely 
productive subcategory – the water metaphor. An article titled Evropeiskii potop9 places the 
influx of refugees within the narrative of the Great Flood: 
Дамбы прорваны. Вчера беженцев было десятки тысяч, сегодня — сотни тысяч, а 
завтра — и миллионы, ведь дело идет к этому. Беженцы заполняют европейское 
																																																								
7 For an updated take on the concept of post-Soviet aphasia, showing its continued relevance in the study of 
modern-day Russian discourse, see Vakhtin and Firsov (2016). This study also serves as an inspiration to the 
present paper. 
8 “Europe is led into a jungle. Inhabitants of European countries, so to speak, are starting to feel “on their skin” 
how helpless the tolerant Europe turned out to be before the avalanche of refugees, among whom there are all 
sorts of criminals.” All translations from Russian are my own. 
9 “European deluge” 
Poljarnyj vestnik 20, 2017 
	
4 
пространство. К чему приведет нынешнее практически неконтролируемое 
нашествие? (Prokof’ev, 08.09.2015).10 
The refugees are transformed into a tidal wave no dams can stop. The wave hits Europe 
with an ever-stronger force. The image of the unstoppable tsunami is threatening enough 
in and of itself, but in the last sentence the wave is also given a hostile will. The stream of 
refugees is not only an uncontrollable natural disaster, but an active invasion. The Great 
Flood thus morphs into an army of enemies occupying and overtaking Europe. This 
antagonistic representation of the refugees is further corroborated by the newspaper’s 
lexical style, where the terms беженец or мигрант are used intermittently with blatantly 
alienating designations, such as нелегал, чужак and пришелец.11 The denominations also 
include far more explicitly negative wording, such as этнорелигиозная бомба, цветная 
мафия and нелегальный шторм – the latter once again showcasing the fertile motif of the 
natural disaster.12 
Central to the social cognition conveyed in Rossiiskaia Gazeta, which is overwhelmingly 
uniform, is the idea that the refugee issue will bring Europe to its knees, illustrated by the 
following apocalyptic prophecies: […] необратимые процессы, которые приведут к 
потере Европой ее идентичности» (Prokof’ev, 08.09.2015), […] это грозит прини-
мающим беженцев странам межгосударственными и внутренними расколами […] это 
напряжение будет разрывать европейские общества» (Rossiiskaia Gazeta/TASS, 
07.09.2015).13 In tune with the Great Flood myth, this doom is represented as a result of 
Europe’s own actions, as illustrated by an article titled Vladimir Putin nazval prichiny krizisov v 
mire:14 
«Мы активно возражали против того, что происходило, скажем, в Ираке, в 
Ливии, в некоторых других странах», - напомнил Путин. «Никто не слушал: 
наоборот, считали, что Москва занимает антизападную позицию. А сейчас, когда 
вы имеете сотни тысяч, уже миллион беженцев, как вы думаете, у нас позиция 
была антизападная или прозападная? (Putin in Latukhina, 11.01.2016)15 
																																																								
10 “The dams are breached. Yesterday, the refugees where tens of thousands, today – hundreds of thousands, 
and tomorrow – millions, as that’s the way things are going. The refugees are filling up the European space. 
What will this current practically uncontrollable invasion lead to?” 
11 Respectively “refugee,” “illegal,” “stranger” and “alien.” 
12 “Ethnoreligous bomb,” “coloured mafia” and “illegal storm.” 
13 “Irreversible processes which will lead to Europe losing its identity,” “the countries receiving refugees are 
threatened by both intergovernmental and internal collapse,” “the pressure will rip the European society 
apart.” 
14 “Putin named the reasons for the world’s crises” 
15 “– We actively opposed what was going on in, say, Iraq, Libya, some other countries, reminded Putin. –
Nobody listened: on the contrary, they thought that Moscow had an anti-western position. And now, when 
you have hundreds of thousands, even millions of refugees, what do you think, did we have an anti-western or 
pro-western position?” 
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Western intervention in the Middle East and Arab countries, which Russia opposed, 
triggered the current crisis. Europe brought this on itself by not listening to the “voice of 
reason” from Moscow. The extension of this assertion, interestingly, is the social cognition 
that Russia is alleviated of any kind of responsibilities in the issue: «–Приток беженцев – 
внутреннее дело Евросоюза и их острая проблема» (Peskov in Latukhina, 14.09.2015)16, 
or more explicitly: «– Расходы по приему и размещению беженцев должны нести те 
страны, которые причастны к дестабилизации ситуации на родине этих людей, 
считают в Кремле. Так что для России участие в программах помощи беженцам вряд 
ли актуальный вопрос» (Peskov in Latukhina, 10.09.2015).17 Helping the refugees is not 
Russia’s job. 
Being the official publication of the Russian government, it is no surprise that the 
political elite dominate the discourse of Rossiiskaia Gazeta. In the case that alternative 
perspectives on the refugee situation gets representation in the newspaper, it is just to be 
rejected, or even ridiculed, as in the following quote: «[…] мне приходилось слышать от 
западных коллег суждения о том, что именно действия России спровоцировали 
мощный поток беженцев в Европу […] Но это очевидное лукавство» (Shvydkoi 
24.11.2015).18 The social cognition centred around the Great Flood motif, where Europe is 
being punished for its political “sins,” then, monopolizes the official discourse. 
 
3.2 Komsomolskaia Pravda 
Komsomolskaia Pravda gives discursive power to a drastically different group than the 
Kremlin elite. The voices dominating the newspaper’s discourse on refugees are “the men 
in the street,” ordinary people without any notable political or social power. What makes 
this group powerful is rather the newspaper’s representation of them as witnesses of truth. 
Part of the Russian diaspora in one of the receiving countries, they have personally 
witnessed something outrageous related to the refugees, and feel obligated to share their 
story. The following account from a bouncer at a club is a characteristic example: 
Я и представить себе не мог, какой ад будет твориться на площади. Я 26 лет 
работаю в секьюрити, но такого не видел. С вокзала валила армия пьяных 
арабов, афганцев и африканцев. […] затеяли драку и достали ножи […] к 
женщинам в вечерних туалетах стали приставать […] подошел полуголый араб с 
окровавленной грудью (кто-то его порезал) и с бутылкой шнапса в руках. Он 
стал орать на гостей: “FUCK YOU ALL”! (Iurchevich in Aslamova, 15.01.2016)19 
																																																								
16 “The influx of refugees is an internal issue for the EU, and their acute problem.”  
17 “The Kremlin considers that the costs for the reception and allocation of the refugees should be carried by 
those countries which were involved in the destabilization of the situation in the countries of these people. 
Participating in programs to help the refugees, then, is hardly a relevant question for Russia.” 
18 “I had to hear judgments from western colleagues, that it was Russia’s actions which provoked the powerful 
stream of refugees to Europe. But that is obvious trickery.”  
19 “I could not have imagined the kind of hell that would unfold on the square. I’ve worked in security for 26 
years, but have not seen anything like this. An army of drunk Arabs, Afghans and Africans came flocking from 
the station. They started fights and pulled knives. They began pestering women in evening dresses. A half-
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The theme of the apocalypse, a bit of an abstract and theoretical discussion on the major 
political level in Rossiiskaia Gazeta, is here represented through concrete empirical observation 
by an ordinary working man. The model of the influx of refugees as a great wave with a 
hostile will, already well established in official discourse, is brought to life in this account: 
the image of the drunken, belligerent army overturning the square, gives a strong sense of 
threat. The idea that the refugees represent a great peril is even verbalized in the hateful 
screams of the blood-drenched Arab.  
A vital part in the model of these Russian witnesses is the concept that only they speak 
the truth. Their central criticism is not necessarily directed at the refugees themselves, but 
at the public debate on them. See how the bouncer from that hell-like night on the square 
portrays German discourse on the issue: 
Но в газетах ничего не было! Тишина! Пятница, суббота, воскресенье. Ничего! Я 
разозлился. Что это значит? Кто-то хочет замести всю историю под ковер? Не 
выйдет! Я свидетель, и я не буду молчать. […] «–Но ведь ты пострадал из-за 
своего правдолюбия? Тебя называют нацистом?» «–А знаешь, почему? Потому 
что я не молчал и открыто высказывал свое мнение о беженцах». (Iurchevich in 
Aslamova, 15.01.2016)20 
The public silence on the havoc wreaked by the refugees is represented as, perhaps, even 
more outrageous than the havoc itself. In contrast to the German newspaper, shying away 
from speaking about the events and sweeping them under the carpet, the Russian witness 
refuses to keep silent. A fitting analogy in this regard, is the whistleblower: Komsomolskaia 
Pravda gives this group of voices an aura of heroism. They are driven by a moral imperative 
to speak out, and let the public know about some form of wrongdoing or great threat. The 
narrative of the hero, of course, gives the “witnesses” significant ethos.  
An extremely interesting sub-section of the paper’s discourse on refugees, or rather, 
meta discourse, is the article series called Хроника гибели Германии.21 The series revolves 
around the diary entries of another witness of truth, the character Galina22, who, like the 
bouncer mentioned above, is both Russian (“наша соотечественница из Казани»23) and a 
naturalized German citizen. Her “reports” on the refugee situation are thus presented as 
doubly relevant: she is represented to the reader both with a deep understanding of 
German society, as well as a genuine connection to the Russian reader. Her premise, that 
Germany and Europe’s willingness to receive refugees is both ridiculous and suicidal («Даже 
																																																																																																																																																																													
naked Arab with a bloody chest (somebody had cut him) and a bottle of schnaps in his hands came over. He 
started yelling at the guests: Fuck you all.” 
20 “But there was nothing in the newspapers! Silence! Friday, Saturday, Sunday. Nothing! I got angry. What 
does this mean? Does someone want to put the whole story under a cover? No way! I am a witness, I will not 
stay silent. – But you have suffered because of your righteousness, yes? You are being called a Nazi? – And do 
you know why? Because I didn’t keep quiet and openly expressed my opinion on refugees.” 
21 “The chronicle of the doom of Germany” 
22 I use the denomination character to emphasize that whether or not Galina is indeed a ‘real’ person is 
irrelevant – what makes her interesting to the analysis is her function within the narrative. 
23 “Our compatriot from Kazan” 
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забавно наблюдать, как и с какой скоростью Европа сама себя губит»24), gains great 
discursive power. Galina’s main critique, however, concerns the refugee debate itself: 
«Германия должна быть цветной!», скандируют демонстранты и требуют при-
нимать больше исламских беженцев. Требуют больше сажать себе на шею. […] 
Кто эти протестанты? Много самих беженцев с профессионально несчастными 
лицами и уродливых теток 50 плюс, которые, это не тайна, активно пользуют 
молодых африканцев. Есть гомосексуалисты, среди которых модны черные 
партнеры. (Ivanova and Skoibeda, 02.09.2015)25 
The voices calling for multiculturalism and acceptance of refugees are utterly undermined 
as illegitimate participants of the discourse in Galina’s account: they are represented 
through the image of the “professionally unhappy” refugees themselves, the desperate 
“ugly aunties” lusting after them, and the gays, who apparently prefer black sexual 
partners. Hardly this dubious group should be included as rational voices in the refugee 
debate. Regardless of this, Galina says, it is the anti-immigration camp that is excluded from 
the discourse: 
«КП» мои заметки опубликовала, и меня накрыл девятый вал обвинений во 
лжи. Странное дело: если кто-то чего не знает, то это что-то тотчас же 
объявляется несуществующим. […] Руководства городов и поселков будто 
состязаются в том, чья инициатива ЗА беженцев будет более придурочной и 
замысловатой. Привел доводы против? Да ты фашист, милдруг... (Ivanova and 
Skoibeda, 05.09.2015)26 
Galina’s first claim is that her representation is “new” to the discourse on refugees, i.e. she 
is verbalizing something that has not previously been sayable in the debate. Because she is 
“breaking new ground” on the discursive field, speaking about something that lays outside 
the reader’s established verbal consciousness, Galina is accused of lying. Her representation 
is rejected as fascist. Only statements positive to the refugees are allowed in the discourse. 
The claim that any negative representations of the refugee issue are denied access to the 
German public debate, is a predominant social cognition in Komsomolskaia Pravda’s 
discourse. A central premise in the narrative of the witnesses of truth is that Europe is 
threatened not only be the refugees, but by the downfall of free speech – interestingly, 
placing the concept of public aphasia in the very centre of the debate: «В Германии: нет слова, а 
																																																								
24 “It’s actually funny to watch how and how quickly Europe is ruining itself” 
25 “Germany should be colourful!,” chant the demonstrators, demanding to accept more Muslim refugees. 
Demanding to tighten the grip around their own necks. Who are these protestors? Many are refugees 
themselves, with professionally unhappy faces, monstrous-looking aunts over 50, who, it’s no secret, actively 
use young Africans. There are homosexualists, among whom black partners are fashionable.” 
26 “Komsomolskaia Pravda published my notes, and I was covered by the ninth wave of accusations of lying. 
It’s a strange thing: if someone doesn’t know something, that thing will immediately be declared as non-
existent. The leaderships in [German] towns and villages will compete on who can make the most stupid and 
intricate initiative FOR refugees. Did you draw conclusions to the contrary? Then you are a fascist, milord…” 
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значит, нет проблемы» (Aslamova, 17.01.2016).27 There are no words available – or allowed 
– to describe the refugee issue, hence the issue doesn’t exist. 
A final finding from the refugee discourse in Komsomolskaia Pravda, is the use of a much 
rougher rhetoric compared to that of the official discourse. The inclusion of “ordinary 
people” seems to legitimize publication of a kind of harsh language that might traditionally 
be limited to the private sphere: «Один сириец выступал по ТВ, давил на жалость: «У 
меня восемь братьев, у моей жены тоже. Нас всего шестьдесят (!!! - Авт.) человек, они 
все там, на войне, под бомбами, хнык-хнык... Их надо сюда перевезти, плак-плак...» 
(Ivanova in Skoibeda, 10.09.2015).28 The Syrian refugee is degraded and ridiculed. The 
language use represents him as utterly pathetic and whiny, i.e. not worth listening to. While 
such oppressive remarks might not be unheard of in some of Komsomolskaia Pravda-readers’ 
private conversations, having them publicized in the newspaper lifts them from the 
personal to the public domain. The social cognition implicit in the quote, then, that we 
shouldn’t bother listening to the refugees, is legitimized and further established in the 
public mind. 
 
3.3 Murmanskii Vestnik 
Approaching the material from Murmanskii Vestnik, one would expect that this discourse 
would stand out both in terms of quantity and quality: placed right in the hotspot of the 
Arctic route for refugees, the newspaper had unique access to and interest in the events. In 
other words, the refugee issue might be expected to occupy a larger part of the news 
discourse relative to the other papers in the study. This proved to not be the case. The 
relevant text material amounted to only a couple thousand words, of which only a few 
hundred discuss the Arctic route specifically. The most notable finding when reviewing the 
paper, then, is the lack of discourse on the Northern refugee situation. Murmanskii Vestnik, in 
this regard, serves as perhaps this analysis’ most striking example of Oushakine’s post-
soviet aphasia: there is a chasm between the “new reality” unfolding in Russia’s 
borderlands and actual news discourse. The refugee situation, to an extent, seems to fall 
outside of what is sayable for the journalists closest to it. 
Regarding what is, actually, said about the refugees in Murmanskii Vestnik, one 
characteristic stands out: a kind of exoticism. The representation of the refugees as others, 
fundamentally different, permeates the discourse. This exoticizing depiction is especially 
clear in the following account from the village of Kandalshka: 
Расположенная в сотне метров от здания районной администрации гостиница 
сама по себе не сильно привлекала бы внимание. Если бы вокруг не было людей 
всех темных оттенков кожи - от светло-коричневого до иссиня-черного. Одни 
сидят в старых автомобилях с ржавчиной на крыльях и трещинами на окнах, 
другие курят у заднего входа, топча снег надетыми на босые черные ноги 
																																																								
27 “In Germany, there are no words, meaning, there are no problems.” 
28 “One Syrian did his act on TV, pressuring for pity: ‘I have eight brothers, and a wife as well. All in all, we are 
60 (!!! – author) people, and they are all there, in the war, under the bombs, sob-sob. They need to be brought 
here, boo-hoo’.” 
Johanne Berge Kalsaas 
	
9 
шлепанцами, третьи несут пузатые пакеты с логотипами ближайших супер-
маркетов. Кто-то, пардон за подробности, бегает справлять нужду за угол бли-
жайшего сарая, видимо, еще не успев заселиться в номер с удобствами. И все это 
происходит на фоне сугробов, заиндевевших берез и свисающих с крыш пяти-
этажных хрущевок огромных сосулек. (Il’in, 13.02.2016)29 
Central to the depiction is the outside-perspective, emphasizing the distinction between us, 
the observing subjects, and them, the observed objects. The refugees are represented in 
terms of their “fascinating foreignness.” The striking contrast of black skin against white 
snow corroborates the sense of witnessing something truly exotic. The focus on this 
startling contrast, however, also conveys the social cognition that Murmansk is hardly a 
natural habitat for this group. They are alien elements.  
The newspaper’s representation of the refugees does not limit itself to exoticism – it also 
seamlessly continues the apocalyptic discourse that we have observed in the other 
newspapers. The effect of the refugees in the Arctic, which is absolutely not Russia’s issue 
(«Что пригнало их на самый север Европы? Действительно ли опасение за 
собственную жизнь или же стремление к беззаботной жизни на халяву? […] К 
счастью, искать ответ на эти вопросы придется не нам, не россиянам». (Ban’ko, 
10.09.2015),30 are illustrated by observations from the journalists’ visits to Northern 
Norway: «И хорошо помню, как чистенький, точно с рождественской открытки, 
городок Вадсё постепенно обрастал арабскими кварталами, похожими на гетто, где 
не работал никто, а наркотики употребляли через одного» (Britskaia, 07.10.2015).31 The 
picture of Vadsoe, having been turned from a pleasant, picture-perfect little place into a 
drug-plagued ghetto by Arab refugees,32 is perfectly in line with the central discourse of 
threat.  
The central characteristics in Murmanskii Vestnik, i.e. the remarkable exclusion of the 
subject of refugees from news discourse and, when including it, discussing it solely from the 
perspective of the disentangled outsider,33 seems to further corroborate the theme of public 
																																																								
29 “The hotel, placed within a hundred meters from the regional administration building, would not attract 
any attention by itself. If it were not surrounded by people with all shades of black skin – from light-brown to 
blue-black. Some sit in old cars with rusty fenders and cracked windows, others are smoking by the rear 
entrance, treading the snow with bare feet in flip-flops, the third group are carrying bulky bags with the logos 
of local supermarkets. Someone, excuse the details, are running to relieve themselves behind the corner of the 
nearest shed, apparently not being able to settle in a room with facilities. And all this is taking place on the 
background of snowdrifts, frozen birch trees, and huge icicles hanging from the roof of five-story 
Khrushchyovka-buildings.” 
30 “What drove [the refugees] to the Far North of Europe? Is it truly danger to their own life, or the search for a 
carefree life on freebies? Luckily, finding the answer to these questions is not for us, the Russians, to do.”  
31 “I remember well how the neat little town of Vadsoe, as if straight out of a Christmas card, gradually grew 
over with Arab quarters, like ghettos, where nobody worked, and every other person used drugs.” 
32 Vadsoe is indeed one of the Norwegian municipalities with the largest number of refugees per capita, but 
the dystopia described in Murmanskii Vestnik is very far from reality. See i.a. Horn (2015) (Norwegian). 
33 Even in the example from Kandalashka, where the refugees are “right next to us,” they are represented as 
“outside” and “other than us.” 
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aphasia in Russian refugee discourse. Despite being enveloped by and entangled in the 
events, the newspaper is not able to discuss them in any meaningful way. The refugee issue 
isn’t given a place in the discursive field, despite – or because of?34 – the societal upheaval 
accompanying it. The solution for this discursive deadlock, which might also, in a way, be 
its prerequisite, is to disclaim any responsibility for the refugee situation. Thus, the 
refugees are represented as Europe’s (and the neighbouring northern village of Vadsoe’s) 
domain. 
 
3.4 Novaia Gazeta 
What sets Novaia Gazeta apart from the other newspapers in this study, is its explicit 
representation of refugees in Russia. While, as just seen in Murmanskii Vestnik, the other 
papers might speak about this group (even if such cases make up a negligible part of the 
discourse), speaking with the refugees, i.e. including them as active participants in the 
debate rather than just its subject, makes Novaia Gazeta unique. The most notable example 
of this representation is an article series about a Kurdish-Syrian refugee family held at the 
airport in Moscow: «Два месяца семья с четырьмя детьми живет за стеклом курилки 
транзитной зоны «Шереметьево». Их подкармливают прохожие, а Россия никак не 
понимает, зачем они бежали из своей воюющей страны. В четверг их начинают 
судить» (Fomina, 17.11.2015).35 The depiction of four children and their parents, trapped in 
a limbo of glass for months and surviving on the mercy of random people passing by, being 
prosecuted for having fled the war, appeals strongly to the readers’ sense of compassion. 
The refugees are represented not only as victims of the violence in the Middle East, but of 
Russia’s apparently inhumane treatment of asylum seekers. The motif of this inhumanity is 
made explicitly clear through the family mother’s words in court: «Я приехала в Россию 
по-человечески жить [sic.], прошу, не лишайте меня этой возможности. Я прошу, если 
не жалеете меня, пожалейте хоть моих детей», — сказала Гулистан в своём 
последнем слове, плача» (Fomina, 19.11.2015).36 This appeal to be treated like a human 
being by the authorities implicitly gives the discourse on Russia’s attitude to refugees a 
deeper dimension – concerning Russia’s attitude to human dignity as such. Novaia Gazeta, in 
this regard, can be read as a metacritic on the dehumanizing language used in the refugee 
discourse of the other newspapers in the study, as supported by the following remark: «Они 
прежде всего люди» (Mineev, 09.09.2015).37 
Another discursive property setting Novaia Gazeta apart, is the thematization of Russia’s 
role in the refugee situation: «Действия России в Сирии усугубили и без того плохую 
ситуацию. Прямым последствием российской военной кампании стали […] 
																																																								
34 The latter perspective might be most fruitful in this regard, as, according to Oushakine, the social turmoil of 
contemporary Russia goes a long way in explaining post-Soviet discursive issues.  
35 “For two months, the family with four children have been living behind the glass of the smoking area in the 
transit zone at Sheremet’evo. They are fed by passers-by, while Russia in no way can understand why they 
have fled their warring country. On Thursday, the prosecution against them will start.” 
36 “I came to Russia to live like a human, I’m begging you, don’t take that opportunity away from me. I beg you, 
if you don’t have pity with me, at least have pity with my children,” – said Gulistan in her final words, crying.” 
37 “They are, first and foremost, people” 
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увеличение числа беженцев в Турцию и Европу» (Tusk in Novaia Gazeta and Reuters, 
09.02.2016).38 Contrary to the social cognition fundamental to all other newspapers in the 
study, Russia is represented as indeed being part of the crisis. The discrepancy between the 
country’s actions in Syria and its attitude to the people forced to flee from the violence, is 
verbalized by one of the refugees on the Arctic route: «Я знаете, чего не пойму: вот 
Россия воюет в Сирии, говорит, что за нас. Бомбит. А вот почему убежища нам не 
дает? Почему в Норвегии есть такие лагеря, а в России нет? Почему мы ей не нужны?» 
(Britskaia, 10.03.2016).39 Russia claims to fight for the Syrian people, yet will not grant them 
protection. Implicit in the quote is also an explanation for at least this one refugee’s 
decision to flee across the Norwegian border: there is no place for him in Russia.  
A final remark on the refugee discourse in Novaia Gazeta, concerns the apocalyptic theme 
running through the entire study. Like the newspapers already reviewed, Novaia Gazeta also 
engages in what can be labelled as dystopian rhetoric when discussing the refugee 
situation. In the present case however, the discourse of threat concerns not Europe, as is 
the case in our other papers, but Russia. To Novaia Gazeta, the refugee crisis serves to 
uncover the corrupted state of Russia: «Каждая трагедия в Европе служит для россий-
ского истеблишмента доказательством: без нас им там никак не справиться. Следо-
вательно, Москва может навязывать этим изнеженным европейцам свои условия. 
Чем хуже в Европе, тем лучше нам» (Martynov, 28.03.2016).40 Russian authorities are here 
represented as a hostile force, consumed with the idea of conquering Europe. There is, 
interestingly, a strong parallel to the depiction of belligerent refugees in our other 
newspapers. The narrative of the pending threat and the imminent downfall of society and 
its public debate41 (whether it be European or Russian), then, persists also in Novaia Gazeta’s 
refugee discourse.  
Concerning the subject of public aphasia, it could be argued that Novaia Gazeta represents 
a breaking point. Through the thematization of refugees in Russia as well the inclusion of 
them as actual participants in the discourse, the newspaper engages in an expansion both 
of what is sayable, and by whom. In a way, this serves to close the gap between what is lived 
and what is verbalized in present-day Russia. There is, however, an important caveat to this 
argument: Novaia Gazeta represents the increasingly marginalized dissenting voices in 
Russia’s public debate. The national news discourse is remarkably uniform, and Novaia 
Gazeta is in every sense an outlier. While its alternative representation of the refugees and 
																																																								
38 “Russia’s actions in Syria aggravated an already bad situation. A direct consequence of the Russian military 
campaign was the increase of refugees to Turkey and Europe.” 
39 “You know, here’s what I will never understand: see, Russia is fighting in Syria, saying it’s for us. They are 
bombing. Then, why are they not giving us asylum? Why are there these kinds of [reception centres] in 
Norway, and not in Russia? Why won’t they have us?” 
40 “Every tragedy in Europe serves as a proof to the Russian establishment, that without us they are lost. 
Accordingly, Moscow can subdue these effeminate Europeans under its own conditions. The worse Europe is 
doing, the better we are.” 
41 In Novaia Gazeta, the Russian news coverage of the refugee situation is labelled as “propagandistic fakes,” a 
“war on Western interpretations,” and “PR instead of information.” See i.a. Khachatrian (2016) and 
Taroshchina (2016). This dystopic representation of public debate on refugees, then, links the present paper to 
the other three: there is a shared sense that the news discourse is fraudulent and corrupt.  
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other issues might be tolerated, it can hardly be said to have any significant influence on 
the broad majority of Russian news consumers.42 
 
4. Conclusion 
Let us now review the findings in light of the theoretical framework: 
 
4.1 Discursive structures and strategies 
According to CDA, the discursive structures contributing to cognitive control (i.e. successful 
dissemination of social cognition) include the following: rhetorical figures, lexical style 
implying negative evaluation, storytelling, accounts from eyewitnesses, quotes from 
authorities, strong relational structuring of the events (i.e. conditions, causes and 
consequences), placing them within a specific narrative, and arousing strong emotions (van 
Dijk 1988, 84–85, van Dijk 1993, 264). All these strategies are actively used in the Russian 
news discourse on refugees: the metaphor of the natural disaster, especially that of the tidal 
wave, is a highly productive rhetorical figure. The choice of words, particularly in 
referencing the refugees themselves, is also in line with the bleak metaphors. The lexical 
mixing of highly antagonizing denominations with more “neutral” terms, also seems to 
transfer the negative connotations of the first group to the second. The designation of 
refugee, then, being semantically intertwined with illegals and criminals, is likely to be 
negatively evaluated by the reader. These “muddy semantics” are especially characteristic 
of the official discourse. 
The strategy of using storytelling and eyewitnesses is especially clear in Komsomolskaia 
Pravda. There are also interesting examples of this in Murmanskii Vestnik. The effect of these 
first hand-accounts, interestingly, is not that the discussed subjects are brought closer to 
the reader. Rather, being represented as so unfamiliar and incomprehensible, the radically 
different other, the refugee is pushed further away from the discursively constructed us. 
Finally, the dystopian narrative of Europe’s doom, where the causes and effects appear 
clearly connected, fits conveniently around the complex of news stories in all three 
newspapers. The emotional aspect of the discourse, especially poignant in the personal 
tales from Komsomolskaia Pravda, amplifies the impression made on the reader. 
An outlier to the generalizations made above, of course, is Novaia Gazeta. Although the 
paper undoubtedly uses the abovementioned strategies (e.g. the rhetorical figure of the 
“glass cage” at Sheremet’evo, a pathos-filled appeal on behalf of the detained family, the 
narrative of a dichotomous relationship between East (Russia) and West (Europe) etc.), its 
discourse stands out due to a difference in underlying social cognition. 
 
																																																								
42 In its report on freedom of the press in Russia, Freedom House (2015) has this to say: “The main national 
news agenda is firmly controlled by the Kremlin. […] The country’s more than 400 daily newspapers offer 
content on a wide range of topics but rarely challenge the official line on important issues such as corruption 
or foreign policy. Meaningful political debate is mostly limited to weekly magazines, news websites, some 
radio programs, and a handful of newspapers such as Novaya Gazeta or the business daily Vedomosti, which 
generally reach a limited audience among urban, educated Russians. These outlets operate with the 
understanding that the government has the means to close them at any time.” 
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4.2 Social cognition 
The social cognition conveyed in Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Komsomolskaia Pravda and Murmanskiy 
Vestnik is uniform on many levels. First, the refugee issue is not a Russian issue. It concerns 
Europe. Even when the refugees are filling up the small towns of Murmansk, the region’s 
biggest newspaper represent them as “not our problem.” Second, the respective discourses 
are permeated by the idea that the refugees are radically different from us. They are by and 
large portrayed as non-human. Any kind of humanitarian views, then, is all but absent from 
the discourse. Third, and in my view perhaps the most interesting social cognition 
uncovered in this study, is the perception that the biggest issue following form the refugees 
is the way they are – or rather, are not – debated. The metacritique is one of the main 
characteristics of the debate and, remarkably, in many ways echoes Oushakine’s 
conceptualization of public aphasia: the discourse is represented as severely restricted in 
terms of what is sayable, and by whom. The conversation is first and foremost marked by a 
restraining silence. Any voices trying to break this state of aphasia, like Galina from 
Komsomolskaia Pravda, are excluded from the debate. It is interesting to observe, then, that 
the concept of public aphasia has a double role in the Russian discourse on refugees: both as 
overarching characteristic and an explicitly verbalized theme. 
Apart from sharing the metacritic approach to the refugee discourse, Novaia Gazeta 
conveys a radically different set of social cognitions, in a way simply an inversion of the ones 
above: First, the refugee issue is indeed a Russian issue. Not only because of Russia’s 
involvement in the Syrian war, but because respect for humanity demands it. The second 
principle is implicit in the first – the refugees are first and foremost human beings. This 
social cognition makes the discourse of Novaia Gazeta very different from the other 
newspapers. 
 
4.3 Silence and challenging the sayable 
Novaia Gazeta, in a way, is the exception confirming the rule in this study: the Russian news 
discourse on refugees is, to a large extent, characterized by silence on what might be 
considered key issues. The study has uncovered a fundamental discursive deficit on the 
following areas: First, the lack of representation regarding Russia’s affiliation with the 
refugee situation. The discourse unfolds chiefly from the perspective of the (allegedly) 
disinterested third-person, making the us-them distinction the central premise for debate. 
The idea that Russia has any kind of involvement and responsibility in the issue, seems to 
not be part of the “sayable.” Second, the the third-person-perspective is apparent also in 
how the Russian newspapers relate to the refugees – they are spoken about, not spoken with. 
These voices, then, are kept silent. Third, in line with the narrative of Russia as a pristine 
contrast to the contaminated Europa, the representation of refugees on Russian territory is 
missing from the coverage. If the reader were only exposed to official discourse, he would 
hardly know that there exists Syrian refugees in Russia. This silence includes issues ranging 
from illegal deportations and corruption in the asylum procedure,43 to the entire complex 
of events unfolding in the Far North during the winter of 2015–16. The lack of discourse on 
these areas, then, translates to “blank spots” in the public mind. Predominating social 
																																																								
43 For an extensive report on the issues of Russia’s asylum system, see Grazhdanskoe sodeistvie (2015). 
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cognition on the refugee issue would not have any place for the Kurdish-Syrian children 
stuck at Sheremet’evo. Excluded from discourse, they can have no influence on the Russian 
public opinion on the refugee situation.  
The position of Novaia Gazeta in the present discourse can be illustrated through the 
analogy of Galina’s account. Just as she claimed to face accusations of lying after verbalizing 
ideas that lay outside of the predominating discourse on refugees, i.e. challenging the limits of 
the sayable, so Novaia Gazeta, as an obvious outlier in the debate, is vulnerable to being 
pushed out of it. The continued focus on discourse ethics44 in the material, however, even if 
this metacriticism mainly concerns “their” (i.e. the European) rather than “our” (i.e. the 
Russian) discourse, spreads social cognition on how the public debate should be. If – and 
how – this central positioning of the subject of public silence in the discourse effects the 
phenomenon of post-Soviet aphasia itself, however, demands further research. 
 
4.4 The need for nuance: refugees in non-Russian news discourse 
To fully consider the conclusions made above, a general remark on refugees in news 
discourse is in order. How has this issue been represented in non-Russian media, and how 
does the Russian news discourse relate to that of other countries? 
Although research on the present subject is still scarce, there are a few studies that can 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the above findings. For instance, in a report 
based on over 600 migrant-related British news stories in 2015, Crawley, McMahon and 
Jones (2016) found that migrants’ voices and perspectives are rarely included.45 The 
migrants are, as a rule, not participants in the news discourse about them. They are also 
predominately framed as either villains or victims.46 While in Russian discourse the narrative 
of the villain is far more prominent than that of the victim, it would not be a far stretch to 
label some of the findings from Novaia Gazeta as examples of the latter.47 In an extensive 
report prepared for the UNHCR (2015) on the EU-countries’ press coverage of the refugee 
crisis, it was found that the refugees tended to be “[…] framed negatively, as a problem.”48 
The report also found that the EU’s handling of the crisis, as a rule, was portrayed as 
“inadequate.”49 In this respect, it could be argued that the Russian news discourse on 
refugees does not stand out in any radical way from that of the European countries. 
What is, however, quite remarkable in the Russian case, is the almost complete public 
silence surrounding refugees in Russia. Excluding the exceptional case of Novaia Gazeta, these 
people have no representation in the present discourse. The public aphasia on Russia’s 
																																																								
44 For an elaboration on the concept, see Habermas 1990, 120–22. 
45 “[Our research] found that just 15% of the newspaper articles which were published on the topic of 
migration in the run-up to the 2015 General Election included a migrant voice or perspective” (Crawley, 
McMahon and Jones 2016, 25). 
46 Crawley et al. (2016), 26–34) 
47 The concept presented in the report by Crawley et al. (2016, 26) of «giving voice to the migrant as ‘victim’,” 
most often presented in a frame of humanitarianism, seems especially relevant in Novaia Gazeta’s coverage of 
the refugee family stuck at Sheremet’evo. 
48 Berry, Garcia-Blanco, Moore (2015), 5. Available from: http://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf [accessed 
30.10.2017] 
49 Berry et al. (2015), 10) 
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refugees, then, stands out as this article’s most notable result. 
 
References 
Berry, Mike, Inaki Garcia-Blanco and Kerry Moore. 2015. Press Coverage of the Refugee and 
Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries. Report Prepared for the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Cardiff: Cardiff School of Journalism, Media 
and Cultural studies. Accessed 30.10.2017. http://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.pdf. 
Carnaghan, Ellen. 1996. “Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence? ‘Don’t Knows’ and Democracy 
in Russia.” Slavic Review 55 (2):325–63. http://doi.org/10.2307/2501915 
Crawley, Heaven, Simon McMahon and Katharine Jones. 2016. Victims & Villains: Migrant 
Voices in the British Media. Coventry University: Centre for Trust, Peace and Social 
Relations. Accessed 30.10.2017. 
http://pure.coventry.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/8263076. 
Dijk, Teun A. van. 1988. News as Discourse. Hillsdale: L. Erlbaum Associates. 
Dijk, Teun A. van. 1993. Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse and Society 4 
(2):249–83. http://doi.org/10.1177/0957926593004002006.	
Freedom House. 2015. “Freedom of the Press: Russia.” Accessed 30.10.2017. 
http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/russia. 
Grazhdanskoe Sodeistvie. 2015. Rossiia kak strana ubezhishcha. Moscow. 
http://refugee.ru/publications/rossiya-kak-strana-ubezhishha/. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 2002. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Hohmann, Sophie and Marlene Laruelle. 2016. “From the Mediterranean to the Far North: A 
refugee corridor at the Russian-Norwegian border.” The Arctic Institute, 24.08.2016. 
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/refugees-corridor-russian-norwegian-border/. 
Horn, Knut Sverre. 2015. “Vadsø vil fortsatt være på flyktningetoppen.” NRK. 25.08.2015. 
Accessed 30.10.2017. http://www.nrk.no/finnmark/vadso-vil-fortsatt-vaere-pa-
flyktningetoppen-1.12517359. 
Jakobson, Roman. 1971. Studies on Child Language and Aphasia. Haag/Paris: Mouton. 
Naumova, Nina. 1999. “Molchanie kak golos surovogo zhiznennogo opyta.” In 
Retsidiviruiushchaia modenrnizatsiia v Rossii: beda, vina ili resurs chelovechestva, edited by 
Sadovskii and Iadov. Moscow: Editorial URSS.  
Oushakine, Serguei. 2000. “In the State of Post-Soviet Aphasia: Symbolic Development in 
Contemporary Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 52 (6):991–1016. 
 http://doi.org/10.1080/09668130050143806. 	
Sæther, Anne Stine. 2015. “Syriske flyktninger er blitt kasteballer i norsk-russisk ‘asylkrig’.” 
VG. 30.11.2015. Accessed 30.10.2017. http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/asyl-
debatten/syriske-flyktninger-er-blitt-kasteballer-i-norsk-russisk-asylkrig/a/23570157/. 
Poljarnyj vestnik 20, 2017 
	
16 
Standish, Reid. 2016. “For Finland and Norway, the Refugee Crisis Heats Up Along the 
Russian Arctic.” Foreign Policy, 26.01.2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/26/for-
finland-and-norway-the-refugee-crisis-heats-up-along-the-russian-arctic/. 
UNHCR. 2016a. “Syria Emergency.” Accessed 30.10.2017. http://www.unhcr.org/syria-
emergency.html. 
UNHCR. 2016b. “Figures at a Glance.” Accessed 30.10.2017. http://www.unhcr.org/figures-
at-a-glance.html. 
Vakhtin, Nikolai and Boris Firsov, ed. 2016. Public Debate in Russia: Matters of Disorder. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Zassoursky, Ivan. 2004. Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia. New York: ME Sharp. 
 
Material 
Aslamova, Dar’ia. 2016. “Chelovek, kotoryi razbudil Germaniiu: Ia nitchego he boius’. Mne 
prosto vazhno skaszat’ pravdu o toi nochi [ekskliuziv «KP»].” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 
15.01.2016. http://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26480/3350416/.  
Aslamova, Dar’ia. 2016. “Esli nichego ne izmenitsia, zhiteliam Germanii ostaetsia libo islam, 
libo natsizm [ekskliuziv «KP»].” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 17.01.2016. 
http://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26481.7/3351106/. 
Ban’ko, Iurii. 2015. “Tam, gde nas uzhe ne zhdut.” Murmanskii Vestnik, 10.09.2015. 
http://www.mvestnik.ru/shwpgn.asp?pid=201509102. 
Britskaia, Tat’iana. 2015. “Beg po peresechennoi zhizni.” Murmanskii Vestnik, 07.10.2015: 
http://www.mvestnik.ru/shwpgn.asp?pid=201510071. 
Britskaia, Tat’iana. 2016. “Rossiia za nas voiuet. Pochemu zhe my ei ne nuzhy?” Novaia 
Gazeta, 10.03.2016. Available from: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/03/11/67736-171-rossiya-za-nas-voyuet-
pochemu-zhe-my-ey-ne-nuzhny-187. 
Fomina, Ekaterina. 2015. “Vitrina Rodiny.” Novaia Gazeta, 17.11.2015. 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2015/11/18/66421-vitrina-rodiny. 
Fomina, Ekaterina. 2015. “Nas chto, za terroristov priznali?” Novaia Gazeta, 19.11.2015. 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2015/11/19/66441-171-nas-chto-za-terroristov-
priznali-187. 
Il’in, Viktor. 2016. “Kandalakshskie afrikantsy.” Murmanskii Vestnik, 13.02.2016. 
http://www.mvestnik.ru/shwpgn.asp?pid=201602132. 
Ivanova, Galina and Ul’iana Skoibeda. 2015. “Khronika gibeli Germanii: Chtoby ublazhit’ 
bezhentsev, katolicheskaia tserkov’ otkazyvaetsia krestit’ mladentsev.” Komsomolskaia 
Pravda, 02.09.2015. http://www.kp.ru/daily/26426/3299114/. 
Ivanova, Galina and Ul’iana Skoibeda. 2015. “Khronika gibeli Germanii-2: Podarite 
bezhentsam budushchee – perepishite na nikh svoe zaveshchanie.” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 
05.09.2015. http://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26426.7/3301110/. 
Johanne Berge Kalsaas 
	
17 
Ivanova, Galina and Ul’iana Skoibeda. 2015. “Khronika gibeli Germanii-3: Radi bezhentsev 
sobiraiutsia meniat’ konstitutsiiu.” Komsomolskaia Pravda, 10.09.2015. 
http://www.kp.ru/daily/26431.4/3302689/  
Khachatrian, Diana. 2016. “Devochka iz russkogo mira.” Novaia Gazeta. 31.01.2016. Accessed 
30.10.2017. http://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/02/01/67248-devochka-iz-
russkogo-mira. 
Latukhina, Kira. 2015. “Peskov: Bezhentsy pytaiutsia ispol’zovat’ territoriiu Rossii.” 
Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 10.09.2015. http://rg.ru/2015/09/10/bejenci-site.html. 
Latukhina, Kira. 2015. “V Kremle sochli krizis s bezhentsami vnutrennim delom ES.” 
Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 14.09.2015. http://rg.ru/2015/09/14/bezhentsi-site-anons.html.  
Latukhina, Kira. 2016. “O pol’ze postoianstva.” Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 11.01.2016. 
http://rg.ru/2016/01/11/putin-interviu-site.html. 
Makarychev, Maksim. 2016. “Evropu vedut v dzhungli.” Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 19.01.2016. 
http://rg.ru/2016/01/19/bezhency-site.html. 
Martynov, Kirill. 2016. “Koets empatii.” Novaia Gazeta, 28.03.2016. 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/03/28/67961-konets-empatii. 
Mineev, Aleksandr. 2015. “Zemlia obetovannaia Evropa.” Novaia Gazeta, 09.09.2015. 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2015/09/09/65540-zemlya-obetovannaya-evropa. 
Novaia Gazeta and Reuters. 2016. “Glava Evrosoveta: Rossiia sprovotsirovala usilene migratsii 
iz Sirii.” Novaia Gazeta, 09.02.2016. 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2016/02/09/118468-glava-evrosoveta-rossiya-
sprovotsirovala-usilenie-migratsii-iz-sirii. 
Prokof’ev, Viacheslav. 2015. “Evropeiskii potop.” Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 08.09.2015. 
http://rg.ru/2015/09/09/gladilin.html. 
Rossiiskaia Gazeta and TASS. 2015. “Pushkov: Bezhentsy stanut dlia ES bomboi zamedlennogo 
deistviia.” Rossiiskaia Gazeta], 07.09.2015. http://rg.ru/2015/09/07/pushkov-anons.html. 
Shvydkoi, Mikhail. 2015. “Rifmy i rify istorii.” Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 24.11.2015. 
http://rg.ru/2015/11/25/shvydkoy.html. 




author: Johanne Berge Kalsaas 
affiliation: independent scholar 
email: johanne.kalsaas@gmail.com 
